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Six decades after the People’s Liberation Armyentered Lhasa, the Tibet problem continues to fester.It erupts through recurring protests by the Tibetan
people. Protest movements shook the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) in 1987-1989, but rocked the larger Tibetan
high plateau on a larger scale in 1956-1959 and more recent-
ly in the spring of 2008.
Multiple and complex causes lie behind these movements.
What is the role of economic concerns, or of political and
cultural demands? Does religion lie behind the rebellion?
Do the growing numbers of Han and Hui settlers in Tibet’s
cities vitiate the situation? Do forced sedentarisation  poli-
cies fuel the fires? Does the Chinese leadership’s approach
to the Tibet issue, especially with regard to rights and liber-
ties, help resolve problems or aggravate them?
These questions apply more generally to the governance of
China’s border regions and are not specific to Tibet. They
have been raised and continue to be raised with regard to
Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, although Tibet’s case stands
out because of the Dalai Lama’s stature and the enormous
sympathy worldwide for Tibetans. Sun Yatsen’s conception
of the Chinese nation as being composed of five peoples
(Han, Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu, and Hui (1)) was at the
heart of building the nation state of “China” right from the
early twentieth century. Since 1949, the People’s Republic
of China has recognised 55 minority nationalities (shaoshu
minzu) but its policies have swung between relatively liberal
and repressive phases, between recognition of religious and
cultural identities and of assimilation. In this regard, the
assimilation of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, which began in
the late Qing dynasty, is a significant example. (2)
As the notion of a zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation)
became central for the Chinese government, it was seen as
the essential basis for legitimising its authority. The anthro-
pologist Uradyn E. Bulag has emphasised: “In light of the
Soviet collapse, the Chinese state has adopted a new way of
managing its multinational empire. Despite its multicultural
guise, China is actually reviving the notion of a single
Chinese people (Zhonghua minzu), which the Chinese
Communists earlier condemned as Han chauvinism.” (3) A
revealing move in this regard was the change in 2008 of the
Zhongyang Minzu Daxue’s English name from Central
University of Nationalities to Minzu University of China. (4)
Moreover, the manner in which the Chinese government
treats the peoples in the border regions reflects the regime’s
authoritarian nature as well as its relations with the popula-
tion as a whole, minority or majority. Seen in this framework
and as Wang Lixiong’s analysis in this issue shows, local
leaders play a major role in the aggravation or resolution of
conflicts. Many examples, such as corruption cases, show
the increasing power of local authorities in their dealings
with the centre, which often appears weak.
This special issue brings together the conflicting views and
criticisms of Tibetologists and Sinologists from different dis-
ciplines. An initial meeting took place in the autumn of
2008 in Paris, which afforded a tentative exchange of
views. (5) The aim was to go beyond clichés to understand the
events of 2008.
Our attention has focused on some insufficiently discussed
points concerning Tibet, by which we mean the whole of the
Tibetan cultural sphere (TAR, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan,
and Yunnan (6)). Given the constraints of time and space, we
have had to leave out the consideration of education (7) and
language (8) and the situation of Tibetans in exile. (9)
This issue begins with a detailed description and analysis of
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1. In the early twentieth century, the term Hui referred to Muslims. Sun Yatsen used
it mainly for the Turcophone peoples, i.e. the Uyghurs today.
2. See Jirgal Burjgin and Naran Bilik, “Contemporary Mongolian Population
Distribution, Migration, Cultural Change and Identity,” in Robyn R. Iredale, Naran
Bilik, Fei Guo (eds.), China’s Minorities on the Move, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2003,
pp. 53-68 ; Uradyn E. Bulag, “Inner Mongolia,” in Morris Rossabi (ed.), Governing
China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, Seattle-London, University of Washington Press,
2004, pp. 84-116.
3. Uradyn E. Bulag, ibid., p. 113.
4. In this instance, the notion of minzu takes the sense of “ethnic group” and not
“nationality,” which would suggest the existence of a nation with a state, as Robert
Barnett points out in a note in his article. 
5. Under the auspices of CECMC (French Centre for Modern and Contemporary China
Studies), the UMR 8173 China-Korea-Japan studies unit of CNRS-EHESS (French
National Centre for Scientific Research and School for Advanced Studies in Social
Sciences) and the Tibet team of the UMR 8155 Centre de recherches sur les civil-
isations chinoise, japonaise et tibétaine (Research Centre for Chinese, Japanese
and Tibetan Civilisations-CNRS-EPHE). This was organised in collaboration with
Heather Stoddard, whom we would like to thank profusely. Her beautifully compiled
80 maps of Tibet could unfortunately not be accommodated in this issue.
6. What is known as Xizang (Tibet) in China refers only to the officially carved out
Tibet Autonomous Region.
7. Educational Review published a special issue in 2008 (vol. 60, n°1) of five articles on
Tibetan education, at home as well as in exile. See also: Andrew Fischer, “Educating
for Exclusion in Western China: Structural and Institutional Dimensions of Conflict in
the Tibetan Areas of Qinghai and Tibet,” CRISE Working Paper (July 2009), Oxford,
Centre for Research on Inequality, Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House.
http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/abstract.shtml?wp69. 
8. See Nicolas Tournadre, “The Dynamics of Tibetan-Chinese Bilingualism,” China
Perspectives, n° 45, 2003.
9. They represent 3 percent of the total Tibetan population and many studies have
already been devoted to them.
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the 2008 events, followed by a series of articles setting out
the historical, social, and economic conditions necessary to
understanding the causes of the Tibetan protest. Finally, it
seemed essential to consider the different voices that have
emerged within Chinese society since 2008.
Tibetologist Robert Barnett offers the most exhaustive descrip-
tion to date of the March-April events of 2008. He shows not
only the strength of protest movements outside the TAR, but
also their implications for rural people and urban youth. 
The contested history (10) of the Tibetan cultural sphere is
considered by the historian Elliot Sperling, who throws light
on fluctuations in the PRC’s official historiography regard-
ing Tibet’s subordination to China. Sperling has translated
from the original Tibetan the Tibeto-Mongolian treaty of
1913, discovered in 2006, which conjointly asserts the inde-
pendence of Tibet and Mongolia. Andrew M. Fischer
analyses the data on the TAR’s economic development
since the 1990s and the “boomerang” effect of the massive
investment policies pursued by Beijing, which heightens the
region’s dependence and marginalises most Tibetans. He
also devotes a brief note to the raging debate on population
in Tibet. Completing the picture on the current situation,
Françoise Robin considers the sedentarisation of nomadic
herders and of the forced relocation of Tibetan farmers. 
In a close look at how the events were followed in Beijing,
Michel Bonnin examines the ways in which the Chinese
government reacted and the parallels with the political rhet-
oric of the Cultural Revolution. Marie Holzman invokes the
courageous individuals who have backed the Tibetans, such
as the noted writer Wang Lixiong. Lara Maconi has select-
ed (and translated into French for Perspectives chinoises)
part of a long analytical text published by Wang on his blog
on the Tibet situation and the system’s contradictions. In
counterpoint, she presents the activities of Chinese national-
ist youth, whose views on the Internet reflect a position crit-
ical of Tibetan protests that is largely shared by the Chinese
population. (11) •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
10. The term refers also to Xinjiang’s contested history. See Gardner Bovingdon, “Contested
histories,” in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang. China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk, M.E.
Sharpe, 2004, pp. 353-374.
11. Although this editorial was drafted before the full ramifications of the 5 July 2009 events
in Urumchi came to light, reports of the protests and crackdown there merely confirm
the analyses in this issue. The constant political pressure and use of force in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region has had similar effects in Tibet: explosions of anger that
meet with renewed repression.
